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The Arrival
“A crowd numbering three or four thousand people assembled at Darwen
Station…when the train was heard to be entering the station, there was a
babel [sic] of eager voices, and every eye was focused on the station exit,
but hopes were quickly dashed to the ground and the crowd was greatly
disappointed when the first passenger to see the gathering shouted, ‘You
can all go home. He got off at Spring Vale [sic].’”1
Darwen and Springvale were economically depressed cotton towns in Lancashire,
England; “he” was Mohandas Gandhi, leader of the Indian National Congress, whose
boycott of English cotton goods was at its height; and the anticipation and
disappointment manifested at the railroad station set the stage for the rest of the visit. In
1931, the Lancashire textile industry had been in a depression for ten years, with huge
losses especially in its exports to the Indian market. The Indian boycott, though only one
factor, and not a very important one, in Lancashire’s decline, was targeted by
industrialists and trade unionists alike as the main cause of the trade depression. At the
same time, Indian nationalists blamed Lancashire for the suppression of the Indian textile
industry. Given this animosity, it seems surprising that Lancashire would be eager to
host Gandhi or that Gandhi would travel to Lancashire. Yet Gandhi and Lancashire mill
owners and workers embraced the opportunity to engage in “frank and friendly
discussion” of the problems surrounding Lancashire and India’s economic relationship.2
Gandhi arrived in Springvale at 11 p.m. on Friday, September 25, 1931 to be
greeted “by hand-clapping and cheers.”3 He visited several mill towns before his
departure at 10 p.m. on Sunday, September 27, 1931. During that time he stayed with
non-conformist, progressive industrialists. He met with the Mayor of Darwen and the
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Mayor of Preston, with mill owners, with Manchester traders, with workers from both
spinning and weaving districts, and with legions of journalists. Newspaper sources in
Lancashire and India reveal the contradictory expectations of the Indian and English
participants of the visit. A story told in the Blackburn Northern Daily Telegraph neatly
illustrates what people in Lancashire wanted the visit to be like. While standing on the
lawn with some workers,
“The Mahatma then approached a woman carrying a child. He stroked the
child’s face. ‘Get hold of the baby, Mr Gandhi,’ some one [sic] shouted,
so he extended both arms. The youngster made no move, and Mr Gandhi
asked in mock despair, ‘What can I do?’ After more coaxing, the baby
smiled back. The mother blushed and neighbours laughed as the Darwen
baby and the Indian leader became friends.”4
Lancashire society anticipated that the “civility and kindliness… simplicity and peace” of
Lancashire air would soothe “even deep differences of opinion.”5 Gandhi’s “native
sympathy [would] materialise in favour of Lancashire’s workless”6 and he would end the
boycott, thus returning Lancashire to its former full volume of trade. However, this
effect did not materialize. Gandhi, while sympathetic to Lancashire’s economic troubles,
saw the visit as an opportunity to educate Lancashire on the nature of Indian nationalism,
not to rescue the unemployed textile workers of Lancashire. He told his audience that the
boycott was not the main cause of their depression and that the boycott was a social and
spiritual necessity for Indian peasants.7 In spite of the rhetoric about dialogue used by
both sides prior to the visit, Gandhi and Lancashire society8 remained too rooted in their
own historical and cultural contexts to successfully communicate with each other.
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The Anticipation
Months of anticipation had preceded Gandhi’s arrival at Springvale Station on
that September night. The visit was originally suggested by Charles Freer Andrews, a
non-conformist minister and a close friend of Gandhi. Andrews went to Lancashire in
June 1931 and was greatly disturbed by the poverty he saw there. He wrote to workers
and mill owners, to Gandhi, and to William Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary of State for
India, proposing that Gandhi meet with people involved in the Lancashire textile industry
in an attempt to heal the resentment between the two parties.9 Andrews’ proposal seemed
to be a success; mill owners and mill workers in Lancashire enthusiastically supported
the idea10 and Gandhi also indicated willingness to speak to Lancashire if he came to
England.11 Gandhi’s attendance at the Round Table Conference in London to consult on
the future constitution of India provided the perfect opportunity for such a trip.
The language used before the visit certainly seemed to indicate that
communication would be possible. Both sides spoke of dialogue, of friendliness, of
reaching a mutual understanding. In a letter to Andrews, Gandhi wrote, he would “gladly
see Lancashire friends immediately on arrival.”12 He claimed that during his visit he
would attempt to “remove any misunderstanding” in the “minds of the people of
Lancashire.”13 Likewise, the Joint Committee of Cotton Trades Organisations, the main
coalition of Lancashire mill owners, responded to Andrews’ suggestion of a visit by
and economic experiences and their political viewpoints. Later in the paper I will explore some of the tensions within
the textile industry. Given how diverse cotton society was, it is all the more striking how unanimous these different
groups are on issues surrounding the boycott, Lancashire’s economic decline, and Gandhi’s visit. In these matters, at
least, Lancashire seemed to speak with one voice.
9
BL/IOR/L/PO/1/48, letter, C. F. Andrews to Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India, June 8, 1931.
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“Interview to the Press,” September 12, 1931, in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [henceforth CWMG] v.
48 (September 1931-January 1932) (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1971), 6.
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informing Wedgwood Benn that Lancashire would be happy to engage in “a frank and
friendly discussion” with Gandhi in the hopes that such a discussion would “remove
some of the misunderstandings which appear to exist in India as well as in Lancashire.”14
The afternoon before Gandhi arrived, Greenfield Mill Co., Ltd. posted a sign on their mill
doors declaring, “We welcome Mr. Gandhi in the spirit of friendliness on this visit.”15 At
first glance it seems that the rhetoric used by both sides indicated a unity of purpose that
boded well for the outcome of the visit.
The similar vocabulary used by Gandhi and representatives of the textile industry,
however, masked very different intentions. The textile workers and mill owners expected
that the discussion would focus on Lancashire’s poverty and would induce Gandhi to end
the boycott. Gandhi saw the visit to Lancashire as part of a larger mission to explain the
Indian National Congress’ cause to British citizens in the hopes of gaining electoral
support for Indian independence. These divergent expectations came from the very
different histories of the two parties, to which I now turn.
“Custom-bound, ageing, inward-looking”16: Lancashire’s reactions to the
depression
At the time of the visit, the Lancashire cotton industry was in the middle of its
most severe depression, a depression that had started in 1922 and would last until the
final demise of the industry some thirty years later. Despite the hard times, however,
most people in the cotton industry confidently awaited a return to better times. And the
good times in Lancashire had been very good indeed. Since the nineteenth century
Lancashire had been the site of the world’s premier cotton-goods industry. Manchester
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and the surrounding region were at the forefront of Britain’s industrial revolution.
Although there were other industries in Lancashire (mining and shipping, primarily),
Lancashire was predominantly a textiles region. In many towns, the mills were the only
source of income for working families. In the nineteenth century, the Empire provided
ever-expanding markets for the goods produced by those mills, as well as becoming a
source of cheap raw cotton.17 In 1913, almost sixty percent of Lancashire’s cotton
products, or three billion yards of cloth, were sent from Lancashire mills to India.18 The
First World War permanently altered these patterns of production and trade, dealing
Lancashire a blow from which it would never recover. During the war years,
Lancashire’s cotton industry stagnated while Indian, Japanese, and U.S. competitors
implemented new, more efficient technology and organization.19 In India, the
competition from native and Japanese mills was combined with nationalist opposition to
British goods. In 1922, the government in Delhi was given fiscal autonomy, with the
result that tariffs on British goods shot up to twenty-five percent by 1931.20 In 1929, the
Indian National Congress instituted a nation-wide boycott of English textiles.
Lancashire’s outdated technology and organization and foreign competition were the
main factors in the decline in Lancashire trade, but the tariffs and the boycott exacerbated
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India, Egypt, and Latin America, all of which took large quantities of Lancashire textiles, were also the major
growers of raw cotton. Alan Fowler, Lancashire Cotton Operatives and Work, 1900-1950: A Social History of
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Aldcroft (Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), 10.
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(Preston, England: University of Central Lancashire, 2000): 9-10.
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Walton, Lancashire, 326.
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Andrew Muldoon, “‘An Unholy Row in Lancashire’: The Textile Lobby, Conservative Politics, and Indian Policy,
1931-1935,” Twentieth Century British History 14, no. 2 (2003): 94. Although the Delhi government was still
controlled by British politicians, not Indians, the politicians in India were more likely to respond to Indian pressure
groups than the London government was. The decision to shift control over Indian’s economic policy from London to
Delhi in 1922 was hotly contested by many in Britain, including a vocal Lancashire group. See: S.C. Ghosh, “Pressure
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markets (Fowler, Cotton Operatives, 8).

6

Lancashire’s problems, as did the stock market crash in 1929. The repercussions of this
chain of events on Lancashire were dramatic. “Between 1924 and 1935…cotton fell from
third to eleventh place among British industries in value of net output.”21 In March 1931,
24,000 out of 90,000 looms in one weaving town had closed and another 46,000 had
stopped indefinitely.22 In 1931, the year of Gandhi’s visit, one in three cotton workers
was unemployed.23 Cotton society searched desperately for a way in which to explain the
industry’s precipitous decline.
Lancashire’s attitude to the depression, the textile industry’s interpretation of the
causes of decline, and Lancashire society’s reaction to Gandhi were all mediated by a
romanticized memory of the nineteenth century cotton industry. Throughout the early
twentieth century, Lancashire society was undergoing enormous economic and social
changes, all of which seemed to bring destruction and despair. As a result, people were
very resistant to innovations. Instead, everyone looked backwards to an idealized version
of the cotton industry’s golden age in the nineteenth century as the standard for the
future. The language of conciliation used during the visit, the resistance to
rationalization, the representation of nineteenth century trading patterns as normal, and
the expectation of imminent revival for the industry all emanated from a commitment to
reinstating the nineteenth century cotton industry.
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A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, vol. 15 of The Oxford History of England, ed. Sir George Clark (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 304-5.
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“Minimising the friction and distress”24: The language of conciliation and its roots
in Lancashire’s labor relations
Although strategies of friendliness and compromise were advocated by both
Gandhi and representatives of the cotton industry, the two parties anticipated very
different outcomes from the dialogue that they promoted. Lancashire cotton society
anticipated certain results from conciliation and face-to-face interaction with Gandhi.
These expectations emerged from the history of labor relations in Lancashire. Lancashire
was famous (in some circles, infamous) for amicable relations between trade unions and
employers. Trade union officials tended to be much more upwardly mobile than in other
regions.25 In 1931, Luke Bates, the secretary of the Blackburn Weavers’ Association,
was also Mayor of Blackburn. Both Bates and Andrew Naesmith, secretary of the
Weavers’ Amalgamation, were referred to as Esquire, a social distinction that was rare
for a member of the working class. Several other trade union members were Justices of
the Peace. The social proximity between trade union officials and employers, as well as
the small-town nature of the cotton industry, meant that much value was placed on faceto-face interaction and reconciliation.26 The emphasis on “personal contact” with Gandhi
was an extension of Lancashire’s standard operating procedure for resolving conflict.27
The statement posted on the doors of the Greenfield Mill asserted this basic philosophy:
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September 24, 1931, p. 4.
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“We believe it is only on a basis of reconciliation and co-operation that the future wellbeing of both Lancashire and India can be built.”28
The connotations of “conciliation” were affected by how Lancashire traditionally
handled industrial disputes. Andrew Flinn argues that “the conservative and cautious
nature of much of the trade unionism in this period was…deeply rooted in occupational
and community identities.”29 Strikes were rare and short-lived.30 Value was placed
instead on consensus, with the result that workers often ended up capitulating to
employers’ demands in order to keep the peace.31 The unions fully endorsed this
“rhetoric of industrial peace”32 with the result that “collective bargaining machinery
rapidly degenerated into a vehicle for autocratic employers to assert their right to manage
as they saw fit.”33 When representatives of the cotton industry (both mill owners and
operatives) argued that “friendly discussion”34 would resolve the tension between India
and Lancashire, what they envisioned was a “reconciliation”35 that involved Gandhi’s
total capitulation to Lancashire demands. In the language used to describe the purpose of
the visit, as in so many other things, Lancashire operatives and employers looked to their
image of the “golden past” of Lancashire’s industrial history for the solutions of the
future.

28
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“Taking a change for the better”36: the interpretation of economic decline as
momentary
Even after ten years of lowered production and exports, Lancashire remained
confident that a revival of production levels was imminent. The pre-war expansion of the
industry “produced a series of statistics…which were to be the point of reference for the
rest of the twentieth century.”37 The cotton industry could not “believe that Lancashire
would not continue to be a major force in world cotton.”38 Throughout 1931, there
remained a sense of constant watchfulness as slight statistical changes were reported with
great import almost every week. The Textile Mercury, a newspaper that catered to mill
owners and Manchester traders, monitored changes in the Indian situation city by city,
week by week. On February 27, the paper stated that “[t]he opinion is growing that the
Indian position has reached the turning point”; on March 6, an article rejoiced that
“Lancashire found reason for renewed hope of much bigger things when the terms of the
settlement of the political trouble in India were made known yesterday”; on March 13,
the paper reported that “even in the storm centre of Bombay, dealers and Indian importers
there are taking up their contracts after the lapse of many many [sic] months.”39 By
October, the paper was enthusiastically (and incorrectly) declaring that the “Congress ban
has practically ceased to operate.”40 The Cotton Factory Times, a paper whose
sympathies were with the cotton operatives and which had a political agenda to the left of
most of cotton society,41 echoed these optimistic assertions, with weekly bulletins of
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hopes for improving trade in the near future (reports on actual improvements were much
rarer than announcements of “anticipation” of increasing markets).42 Even when more
pessimistic opinions were voiced, they were usually refuted within the same issue, if not
within the same article. In one of The Cotton Factory Times’ more negative articles, the
author states that “[t]he past quarter…has been as bad, so far as unemployment is
concerned, as 1930, and there does not seem any immediate hope for better times.”43 Yet
he concludes the paragraph: “perhaps we can in the near future look for better times in
Lancashire for the cotton trade.”44 This positive outlook was rooted in a fervent belief
that Lancashire’s textile industry would continue to be as great as it had been in the
nineteenth century.
The resistance to rationalization, or improvements in organization and
technology, stemmed from the assumption that since Lancashire had been at the head of
the world’s cotton textile production for a century, it should continue to lead the world,
without needing to update technology or organization. What had worked for Lancashire
in the past was expected to continue working.45 Workers and employers discounted
criticisms of Lancashire’s outdated industrial policy from “rank outsiders, politicians, and
amateurs.”46
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See for example: “Peace in India: Civil Disobedience Off,” CFT, March 6, 1931, p. 3; “Preston Spinners: Indian
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Rationalization was implemented in several other industries in Britain (with
varying degrees of success) during the 1930s.47 Rationalization usually involved
amalgamation among companies and the introduction of new technology. In Lancashire,
the major change in technology that was advocated was a shift from the nineteenth
century technique of mule spinning to the new method of ring spinning.48 Those in favor
of rationalization also argued for the combination of spinning and weaving companies
into big concerns that could coordinate technological advances and wages.49 These
innovations were adamantly opposed by both trade unionists and industrialists.50 As the
situation in the industry became ever more dire in the 1920s and 1930s, owners and
operatives occasionally used pro-rationalization rhetoric to undermine the other group.51
Rationalization would surely be implemented, stated the Textile Mercury, if it were not
for “the obstructionist attitude of the trade unions.”52 “Employers,” countered The
Cotton Factory Times, “are the biggest obstacle to social and industrial reform.”53 In
reality, however, neither group was committed to change.54
Trade unionists feared rationalization because it often came with a loss of union
power. Workers worried that the shift from mule spinning to ring spinning would be a
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Thorpe, “‘Gradualism,’” 105-6. The Labour government of 1929-31 intervened in iron and steel, two other failing
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52
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decline from skilled to semi-skilled labor, involving a loss of status and wages.55 The
only reorganization that employers in Lancashire were willing to implement was the
“more looms” system, where workers manned six or eight looms instead of two or four
without a corresponding raise in wages.56 This system “seemed to confirm the view that
reorganization meant simply more effective exploitation of labor.”57 Pro-Labour papers
occasionally vilified the employers for resisting industrial reorganization,58 but in
practice the workers, too, were unwilling to modernize.
However, as historian Alan Fowler says, “the cotton trade union leaders of the
interwar years can perhaps be forgiven for not responding in a more imaginative way to
economic crisis for neither, after all, did their employers.”59 Joseph White argues that
even in the prosperous years up to 1914, industrial magnates were not “disposed toward
innovation and experimentation.”60 During the depression, when resources were scarce,
employers were even less willing to risk money on industrial reorganization.61 Changes
in technology, vertical integration, and lower prices were vehemently rejected as
unnecessary and damaging.
Lancashire cotton society was unwilling to see that changes in the rest of the
world had made the factory system of the nineteenth century impractical. Indeed,
changes in the outside world were sometimes used as justification for resistance to
rationalization. As late as 1936, the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners Associations
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was arguing that the rise in tariffs occurred because “every competing industry finds high
protective tariffs necessary to keep Lancashire products out of their own country.”62
Tariffs were proof, not that Lancashire needed to become more competitive in order to
keep export levels up, but “that the vague and general charges of inefficiency leveled at
our industry, even by men in responsible position [sic], are without foundation.”63
Those changes in external conditions that Lancashire did acknowledge were seen
as temporary, abnormal occurrences. The “pronounced and unhealthy growth” 64 of the
Japanese and Indian textile industries were seen as being aided by tariffs and boycotts
erected by nationalists who were impractical and unfair.65 These hindrances to “normal”
trade relations, however, were for the most part perceived as momentary.66 Lancashire
regarded the boycott and tariffs as aberrations that should disappear. This led them into
conflict with the British government, as employers and traders in the cotton industry
simultaneously pressured London to crush the Indian nationalist movement and resisted
governmental pressure for industrial reform.67
External factors were used as excuses to avoid changing the status quo in the
Lancashire factory system. Throughout the cotton industry’s steady decline in the
interwar years, both mill owners and mill operatives consistently and emphatically laid
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the blame on causes that lay outside Lancashire. In speaking of the nineteenth century,
Patrick Joyce writes that the “idea of an external enemy was in fact very strong…
particularly…in industries dependent on foreign trade [or] subject to foreign
competition.”68 In the twentieth century, the cotton industry’s primary markets were
India and China, which were increasingly being lost to Indian and Japanese competition.
As a result, Indian tariffs, the boycott, and Japanese competition became three factors that
were used by Lancashire as the sole explanation of the region’s waning economic
power.69 “It would be a gross error,” the Burnley and District Weavers’, Winders’ and
Warpers’ Journal stated, “to convey the impression that the depression in the cotton
trade…is due solely to the out-of-dateness of our industry.”70 The Blackburn Cotton
Employers’ Association informed the government in London that
“the Government [would] be spending their time and energy more
profitably in helping to improve the Cotton Trade if they would leave the
question of Amalgamation and Re-organisation to the trade itself, and
would concentrate their undivided attention on the six Clauses given
above.”71
The six clauses included excessive taxation, tariffs, monetary policy, and
“lawlessness and disorder in the chief markets” (a clear reference to the Indian
boycott).72 Industrialists and workers expected the government to prevent Indian
nationalism and Japanese competition from threatening Lancashire trade.
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Although several external factors were used by Lancashire to explain the trade
depression,73 the Indian nationalist boycott received by far the most blame. Statements
such as that made by the Darwen Weavers’ Association Committee that “10,000 people
were unemployed in Darwen, mainly through the Indian boycott” were common.74 In
April 1931, eight thousand people gathered in Blackburn “to inform the Government
that…unless a firm stand is taken which will stamp out Sedition, Lawlessness and
Disorder [in India], there can be no hope for a revival of the Lancashire Cotton Trade.”75
This meeting was jointly run by the trade unions, employers’ association, and Manchester
Chamber of Commerce. The venom directed toward the boycott was totally out of
proportion to its effect on Lancashire’s trade, as Gandhi and others tried to argue.76 The
focus on external causes, however, like resistance to rationalization and the evocation of
traditional labour-employer relationships in the language of conciliation, was directly
linked to the tendency of workers and employers to interpret their current situation in
light of the nineteenth century.
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“Gandhi, the bania, the dealer in bargains” vs. “Gandhi, the idealist”77: the theory
and the practice of khadi
The 1929-32 boycott was the result of twenty years of Gandhi’s musing on the
economic, spiritual, and political implications of Indian independence. Gandhi’s ideas
about independence were intimately linked to the concepts of swaraj, swadeshi, and
khadi. These terms must be defined before any exploration of Gandhi’s philosophy is
possible. Gandhi’s definition of swaraj differed from that of most other Indian
nationalists. Swaraj means self-rule, and for most nationalists, swaraj meant merely a
political shift of power from the British to Indians. Gandhi, however, disdained this idea
of independence as “English rule without the Englishman.”78 Gandhi’s swaraj entailed a
revolution in Indian cultural and economic life as well as in the political realm. For
Gandhi, swaraj could not be achieved without embracing swadeshi. Swadeshi translates
as “of one’s country” and is mostly used specifically in the context of goods being either
foreign or swadeshi. For the majority of Indian nationalists, any goods made in India
qualified as swadeshi. Gandhi, however, had a much more specific, spiritual definition of
swadeshi. For him, swadeshi meant “reliance on our own strength…the strength of our
body, our mind and our soul.”79 Integral to this definition of swadeshi, particularly of
swadeshi cloth, was the idea that swadeshi goods should not be produced in factories
because factories were immoral and un-Indian.80 This definition of swadeshi led Gandhi
to embrace khadi as the quintessential swadeshi product. Khadi is usually translated as
homespun cloth, although Gandhi’s rules for what qualified as khadi changed over time.
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For Gandhi, the achievement of swaraj was predicated on pursuit of swadeshi, and,
particularly, of khadi production.
In Gandhi’s most developed, most theoretical articulations, swaraj, swadeshi, and
khadi were inextricably intertwined practices. In 1939, Gandhi told the Indian National
Congress that “[k]hadi…is the symbol of unity of Indian humanity, of its economic
freedom and equality and, therefore, ultimately, in the poetic expression of Jawaharlal
Nehru, ‘the livery of India’s freedom.’”81 Khadi was nothing less than the physical
incarnation of swaraj. “Real home-rule,” Gandhi explained in Hind Swaraj (1909), “is
self-rule or self-control. The way to it is passive resistance: that is soul-force or loveforce. In order to exert this force, Swadeshi in every sense is necessary.”82 Khadi was
the most important swadeshi product for two reasons. First, food and clothes were the
two essentials of life and true swadeshi meant each person being able to provide him- or
herself with those essentials.83 Second, spinning provided valuable time for meditation,
so that everyone who spun could be led to the path of satya (truth) and ahimsa (nonviolence).84 For Gandhi, khadi was the perfection of swadeshi; swadeshi taught ahimsa;
ahimsa was the only way to achieve swaraj.
Although this was clearly the theoretical basis behind Gandhi’s championship of
khadi, using this simple formula to describe his ideas is difficult because Gandhi stressed
different aspects of his theory to different audiences. Gandhi’s ideas about khadi were
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not developed in a vacuum, although he did try to present his beliefs as “pure” and
unsullied by economic or political considerations. Gandhi’s shifting theory of khadi was
a response, in part, to changing political and economic factors in India and England. In
the spiritual, abstract realm, khadi, ahimsa, swadeshi, swaraj were all one. In his
political capacity, however, Gandhi might emphasize the economic necessity of khadi,
the political expediency of boycott, or the traditional nativist value of swadeshi.
The fully articulated theory of khadi and swaraj took quite some time to develop.
Gandhi spent years grappling with different ideas on swaraj, India, and industrialization
before arriving at his philosophy of khadi. Gandhi’s attention to political matters, as well
as his exposure to various religions, began while he lived in England in the early 1890s,
studying to be a barrister. It was in London that Gandhi discovered European critiques of
Western industrialism.85 It was at this time that Gandhi also began to read Indian
nationalist writings and discovered, among others, Romesh C. Dutt’s theory of the
“economic drain” imposed by Britain on India.86 Gandhi took these ideas with him to
South Africa, where he lived and worked until 1914. It was in South Africa that Gandhi
first employed satyagraha, usually translated as passive resistance or non-violent
resistance,87 in opposition to the British government. It was also in South Africa that he
began to pay attention to the struggles of Indian nationalism in India, as well as elsewhere
in the Empire.
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Swadeshi was already part of the nationalist vocabulary when Gandhi began
articulating his own ideas of swadeshi, which interacted with and diverged from previous
incarnations of the idea. Early nationalists88 advocated boycotting British cloth in favor
of swadeshi cloth as a specific response to the historical relationship between the political
and military subjugation of India and the economic exploitation of Indian raw cotton and
suppression of the indigenous textile industry by the British. The history of textiles in
India was so fraught with nationalist tensions that Jawaharlal Nehru said that the “history
of cotton and of textiles…might be considered the history of India.”89 The British had
originally arrived in India as traders, in search of spices and Indians’ magnificently
woven textiles. Over time the British East India Company started interfering in local
politics and in 1758 they were granted the diwan, or landlord rights, to the province of
Bengal. As the EIC, backed by the British Parliament, poured more money and more
arms into settling new markets in India, the British gradually took political and military
control over the entire sub-continent. At the same time, the Industrial Revolution was
gaining a foothold in Britain. By the 1820s and 1830s, India’s textile production in
Calcutta and similar cities had been squashed and India was converted into a producer of
raw goods for the Lancashire factories. In the late nineteenth century, Indian nationalists
began to rediscover this history and to blame England for stifling India’s historic
industry.90 Swadeshi was first advocated by Indian nationalists in the early twentieth
century as being retributive justice as well as proving an invaluable tool with which to
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pressure Britain. Gandhi built on this earlier tradition of swadeshi even as he criticized it
and enlarged upon it.
Hind Swaraj, Gandhi’s first political manifesto, was written in 1909 while
working and living in South Africa, but it explicitly addressed the nationalist movement
in India. Hind Swaraj contained a critique of industrialization, as well as of British rule
and culture, and advocated a return to “traditional” Indian values. Although he drew on
earlier nationalist thought, Gandhi’s theories involved a radical departure from previous
ideas of swaraj. In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi paid tribute to the earlier generation of
nationalist thinkers, such as Dadabhai Naoroji and Romesh Dutt.91 Yet while
acknowledging their efforts, Gandhi criticized these nationalists for their lack of
imagination in defining swaraj. In the chapter in Hind Swaraj entitled, “What is
Swaraj?” Gandhi claimed that an independence in which the British removed their
political and military power from India but Indians continued to live like the British
would be no independence at all.92 He was deeply critical of nationalists who wanted
“English rule without the Englishman…that is to say, [who] would make India English,
and when it becomes English, it will be called not Hindustan but Englistan.”93 Gandhi
rejected predominant views of Britain as the superior society. He represented India as an
“Ancient Civilisation, which is the Kingdom of God.”94 To gain true swaraj, India must
reject modern Western industrial madness. All the themes that were to be central to
Gandhi’s promotion of khadi (with the exception of the idea of peasant uplift) were
present in Hind Swaraj, but the relations between those ideas were not yet articulated.
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When Hind Swaraj was written, Gandhi’s general theory of swadeshi had not yet
become focused on khadi as the Indian industry. In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi praised the
Bengal swadeshi campaigns, but said that the boycott should have been “a boycott of all
machine-made goods” rather than of just British goods.95 He argued that “it were better
for us to send money to Manchester and to use flimsy Manchester cloth, than to multiply
mills in India…[B]y reproducing Manchester in India, we shall keep our money at the
price of our blood, because our very moral being will be sapped.”96 Here was a critique
of industrialization as un-Indian and immoral, but at this point (1909), Gandhi saw textile
mills as just one example among many of the “bane of civilization.”97
Hind Swaraj, although it carries a lot of weight as Gandhi’s only political
manifesto,98 was an early piece of work, written about India at a point when Gandhi was
only familiar with India’s political and economic situation from a distance. It was only
once he began working in India after 1915 that Gandhi began to focus on textiles as the
key issue in the struggle for swaraj. Gandhi quickly became involved in the politics of
Ahmadabad, one of the biggest mill towns in India. He built his ashram on the outskirts
of Ahmedabad, and developed relationships with textile workers and mill owners.
Gandhi’s work with the textile workers in the strikes of 1917 was the first example of
Gandhi’s incorporation of social groups that were ignored by other nationalists.99
Ahmedabad provided Gandhi with an opportunity to explore the textile industry he had
criticized so sharply in Hind Swaraj.
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Gandhi’s work in Ahmedabad was the beginning of a relationship with Indian
industrialists that was constantly being renegotiated. The growth of the textile industry
after World War I in Bombay, Ahmedabad, and other cities had made Indian mill owners
a significant group in Indian politics.100 Traditionally, industrialists had aligned
themselves with the British government, rather than with nationalist opposition.101 Since
Gandhi knew the mill owners would not support nationalist politics,102 he felt
comfortable in his early writings condemning the use of industrial cloth wholesale. But
industrialists' political positions shifted during the 1920s and ’30s, and Gandhi’s rhetoric
on industrialization vacillated in response to these shifts. He never retreated from his
belief that industry was immoral, but he was willing to moderate his rhetoric when he felt
that industrialists might endorse the nationalist movement.103 During Gandhi’s work in
Ahmedabad in 1917, he developed several lifelong friends and political supporters among
the mill owners. These industrialists were instrumental in funding Gandhi’s ashram, as
well as his peasant education efforts and khadi production.104 By the 1930s, many
industrialists, in Bombay and other cities as well as in Ahmedabad, felt that the benefits
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of supporting the nationalist movement now outweighed the dangers of doing so.105
Many industrialists participated in the 1929-32 boycott though they had not in the INC’s
swadeshi movement of 1919-22. Despite Gandhi’s involvement with mill owners from
1917 onwards, he always downplayed these connections to focus on what he saw as his
most important work: his involvement with Indian peasants.
Throughout his career in Indian politics, Gandhi was very involved with
improving conditions of life for Indian peasants.106 Gandhi argued that the pure, Indian
villages were being impoverished by the corrupt, industrialized, Westernized cities.107
Khadi production was, for Gandhi, the ideal tool with which to return India to its
previous state of sacred, self-sufficient village communities that had no need of foreign
trade, cities, or industry—“the village of my dreams,” Gandhi called it.108 The peasants
needed “a daily task that is not mere drudgery,” and khadi was the perfect instrument.109
To create his ideal villages, Gandhi organized groups to reach out to marginalized
communities of peasants, especially peasant women, bringing them “the message of the
spinning-wheel.”110 He saw this “constructive programme,” as he called it, as central to
the attainment of swaraj.111
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By the mid-1910s, Gandhi had the “theology” of khadi112 worked out, but the
practicalities continued to daunt him. In his Autobiography, Gandhi detailed how
difficult it was for him to find the technology and the knowledge needed for handspinning and hand-weaving.113 Gandhi later admitted that although he advocated khadi
“as the panacea for the growing pauperism of India” as early as 1908, he had only seen a
handloom or spinning wheel once in his life at that point.114 The ashram he founded did
not begin to manufacture woven cloth until 1917 and it took almost another two years
before Gandhi could find a spinning wheel and someone who could teach hand-spinning.
During that time the ashram produced what it called khadi, although it used mill-spun
yarn. Only by the end of 1918 did the ashram define khadi as hand-spun and handwoven, although for political purposes Gandhi moderated this definition outside the
ashram.115
Although not all Gandhi’s ideas on khadi were accepted outside his ashram, khadi
in a looser sense did become central to the Indian National Congress’s opposition to
British rule from the 1920s through independence. After the 1920s, khadi was always a
visual symbol of INC resistance.116 The spinning wheel appeared on the flags adopted by
the Indian National Congress in 1921 and 1931.117 To this day, official versions of the
Indian flag must be made of khadi.118
The INC’s first engagement with Gandhi’s ideas of khadi and ahimsa occurred
during the 1919-1924 non-cooperation movement. In many ways, this movement was a
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predecessor to the 1929-1932 civil disobedience movement and provided an opportunity
for Gandhi and the INC to work out the practices of boycott and satyagraha. Although
swadeshi was adopted by the INC, Gandhi felt that “[k]hadi had not as yet found its
proper place.”119 The resolution adopted by the INC in 1920 framed khadi as the
expedient back-up for the industrial swadeshi production. It stated:
“This Congress advises the adoption of swadeshi in piecegoods on a vast
scale and inasmuch as the existing mills of India with the indigenous
capital and control do not manufacture sufficient yarn and sufficient cloth
for the requirements of the nation…this Congress advises immediate
stimulation of further manufacture by means of reviving handspinnning in
every house and handweaving on the part of millions of weavers.”120
Even this minimal support for khadi was to prove temporary. By 1922, the noncooperation movement had lost momentum and by 1924 was officially declared over.
The INC’s endorsement of khadi was always contingent on its effectiveness as a
political tool. During times when resistance to the British was widespread there was a
rise of organizations and resolutions supporting khadi. But during the periods of less
antagonistic policies, when the INC’s executive committee was not directly under
Gandhi’s influence, khadi ceased to be a focus of INC action. Thus, the non-cooperation
movement of the early 1920s saw the creation of a Khaddar (Khadi) Board to increase
education and production of khadi throughout India and the passing of a resolution that
all Congress representatives must wear and spin khadi.121 Once non-cooperation ended,
however, the resolution was repealed and the Khaddar Board suspended.122
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Gandhi continued his work with khadi even without the INC’s support. With the
end of non-cooperation, Gandhi “retired” from politics (something he was to do many
times during his career as India’s foremost politician) and returned to his ashram. There
he set about continuing his constructive work outside the formal apparatus of Congress.
He founded the All-India Spinners’ Association (ostensibly not a Congress operation,
although run by several Congress members) to replace the Khaddar Board.123 During the
“lull” period of the mid and late 1920s, Gandhi concentrated on the spiritual and social
impacts of khadi and cultivated a network in the villages of peasants who were to be
instrumental in the 1929-32 boycott.
By the end of the twenties, the INC was again ready for a major push against
British power. The younger members of the INC, including Jawaharlal Nehru, were
impatient with continued delays in implementing the new Indian Constitution. Indian
nationalists particularly resented the high-handed nature of the Simon Commission of
1927, which was intended to review Indian conditions to determine the measure of selfgovernment in the new constitution, and which totally excluded Indian advisers.124 In
1929, the Congress resolved to begin a campaign of civil disobedience to push for purna
swaraj, or complete independence (as opposed to greater political autonomy within the
Commonwealth). As the INC prepared for nationwide action, they appealed to Gandhi to
return to command. Seeing that he was now in a position to push his agenda, Gandhi
agreed. As with the earlier non-cooperation movement, the civil disobedience movement
included an endorsement of swadeshi. In order to put extra pressure on the British,
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Gandhi agreed to limit the boycott to British, rather than all foreign, goods125 and to
broaden the definition of khadi to include all Indian manufactured cloth, not merely handspun and/or hand-woven.126
Many people who took part in the 1929-1932 civil disobedience movement had
never participated before in nationalist action. Peasants involved in Gandhi’s khadi
education network were mobilized, as were mill owners in the cities, and the traditional
professional elite of the INC. The movement had an unprecedented geographical and
social breadth. One measure of the strength of local support networks Gandhi had built
up was that when all the major leaders of the INC were arrested civil disobedience
continued with just as much, or more, fervor than previously.127
The civil disobedience movement had such an effect in both India and England
that in February of 1931, Gandhi was invited to meet with the Viceroy of India, Lord
Irwin, in an attempt to come to some accommodation. Over many days of negotiations,
Gandhi and Irwin finally agreed on certain compromises.128 Gandhi agreed to expand the
boycott to include all foreign-produced cloth, instead of limiting it to British goods,129 to
end violent or coercive picketing,130 and to end civil disobedience for the time being.131
In return, Irwin agreed to release several political prisoners and to countenance the
continued boycott in its altered form.132 He also offered an invitation to Gandhi to attend
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the Round Table Conference in England to participate in the discussions about a new
constitution for India. Accordingly (and after months of indecision), on Saturday, August
29, 1931, Gandhi embarked on the S.S. Rajputana to travel to London and ultimately to
Lancashire to engage in “friendly discussions”133 with those who blamed him the loss of
their livelihood.
Anticipations: Lancashire and Gandhi’s differing understandings of the purpose of
the visit
Although Gandhi and Lancashire spokesmen talked about communication, they
anticipated very different outcomes from the conversations. Operatives and mill owners
expected that discussions with Lancashire workers would lead Gandhi to realize the
boycott’s devastating impact on the textile industry and to end the boycott. This idea was
present from the first moment of invitation, when Andrews suggested that the discussions
between Lancashire and India “might lead to some fair division of trade on behalf of
labour.”134 Despite his sympathy for Indian nationalism, Andrews felt that the boycott
was “hitting below the belt” in “a double act of violence not merely hitting Lancashire,
but hitting England also” and was, therefore, not in accord with Gandhi’s principle of
ahimsa, or non-violence.135 Andrews believed, and encouraged the Lancashire
community to believe, that Gandhi would end the boycott once he saw its effects
firsthand. The outrage expressed by The Darwen News the week after Gandhi’s visit
reveals the light in which Lancashire viewed the “communication” that was to have taken
place:
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“The impression conveyed to the majority of people here was that the visit
was with a view to any misunderstandings or differences being dissolved in
the hope that our trading relations with India might ultimately be reestablished.”136
The belief that Gandhi would end the boycott once he saw Lancashire’s poverty was
advanced by Andrews, but had deeper roots in Lancashire’s belief about the power of
conciliation and misconceptions about the nature of Gandhi’s mission in India.
In declarations about the visit made by trade union representatives, mill owners,
and newspaper reporters, cotton society revealed the fervent belief that face-to-face
communication would solve all the conflict between Lancashire and India. In the weeks
prior to Gandhi’s visit, friendliness was advocated by people of all political backgrounds
and social positions. The Conservative Textile Mercury, which over the previous months
consistently had cast aspersions on Indian nationalists’ ethics and intelligence, cautioned
their readers that “it was of vital importance that any comments on the case…should be
framed so as not to risk prejudicing the friendly discussions which we all hope will be
arranged.”137 Luke Bates, Mayor of Blackburn and Secretary of the Blackburn Weavers’
Association, who had said in February that he “could not regard him [Gandhi] as a friend
of Lancashire,”138 in September advised that Gandhi “should be welcomed.”139 This was
not hypocrisy. Rather, Bates’ turn-around stemmed from the belief, widespread in
Lancashire, that Gandhi should be welcomed because “his visit would be productive of
considerable good;”140 that is, that his visit would result in an end to the boycott, and
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hence, to Lancashire’s depression. “Friendly discussion,”141 “candid” and “frank”
conversations142 were seen as a panacea to solve even the worst of Lancashire’s
economic problems.
The idea that Gandhi would effect an about-face in his policy as a result of the
visit gained strength from the romanticization of Gandhi as a humanitarian and a friend of
the peasant/worker. The Darwen News explained the impetus behind mill owner Corder
Catchpool’s invitation: “Mr. Gandhi has a heart that quickly responds to the sight of
human suffering and poverty, and Mr. Catchpool’s idea was that he should come and see
for himself what the effect of the Indian boycott and the cotton duties was upon
Lancashire.”143 Bates said that “if Gandhi could see for himself the devastating effect of
his policy among the Lancashire cotton operatives…he, as a humanitarian and a deeply
religious man, would realise what our grievance is.”144
The idea of Gandhi as humanitarian is one area in which social and political
differences between the newspapers are articulated. The pro-Labour newspapers aimed
at the working class tended to emphasize Gandhi’s support of the “voiceless millions” of
Indian peasants. In these newspapers, Gandhi’s support of the Indian peasants was
interpreted to mean that he would also support Lancashire’s working class. The Cotton
Factory Times explained that hopes for the visit were based on “the fact that Gandhi is
the friend of the poor in all climes.”145 If Gandhi was “aflame in the interests of the
poorest of the poor,” then, reasoned George Brame, secretary of the Clitheroe Weavers,
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Winders and Warpers’ Association, he would not inflict further economic devastation on
Lancashire once he saw the misery of the unemployed mill workers.146 Less political
working-class newspapers merely cited Gandhi as a humanitarian, not stressing his
championing of peasants. The Textile Mercury, the Conservative, upper-class
newspaper, did not emphasize either Gandhi’s status as a humanitarian or his interest in
improving peasant life. Its hopes for the visit were expressed only in terms of personal
interaction and exchanges of opinion. The identification of Gandhi as a friend of the
peasant (or the lower classes) was specific to the working-class papers. The idea that
Gandhi’s humanitarianism would lead him to end the boycott demonstrates the failure of
textile workers and industrialists to appreciate the difference between Lancashire poverty
and the poverty of the Indian peasants, to understand the nationalist impetus behind the
boycott, or to consider the spiritual facet of Gandhi’s anti-industrial policy.
Gandhi, while using similar language of friendship and dialogue, had objectives
for the visit that were in direct conflict with Lancashire’s expectations. Gandhi intended
to educate his Lancashire audience about the purpose of the boycott, the intentions of
Indian nationalism, and the exploitative nature of British imperialism. He also hoped to
gain support among the British electorate, particularly amongst the working class, for
Indian independence. This hope was encouraged by Andrews in his initial proposal for
the visit. In his letter to Gandhi, Andrews argued that Gandhi “could get his own position
with regard to the freedom of India much more generously recognised in this country” if
he ended the boycott.147 While Gandhi had no intentions of buying British support by
ending the boycott, he did hope that he could convince British citizens, especially the
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working class, to see the justice in Indian independence. His trip to Lancashire was of a
piece with this larger goal.
Gandhi’s plans for his visit to England had very little to do with the Round Table
Conference, and much more to do with exposing his British audience to the ideals of (his
own) Indian nationalism. From the beginning, Gandhi had little faith in the constitutional
negotiations of the Round Table Conference. He did not trust “the unbending and
unbendable…Government” to provide any substantial changes to India’s status.148 He
also felt that a “merely” constitutional swaraj, without economic and spiritual selfsufficiency for every Indian, was meaningless.149 While in England, Gandhi tried “to
show to every Englishman and Englishwoman [he met] that what the Congress stands for
is what is deserved by India.”150 Often he framed his mission in populist terms; Gandhi
claimed to be “the sole representative of those half-starved, half-naked dumb millions” of
Indian peasants.151 He was particularly interested in bringing his message to the working
class of England.152 Thus he chose (at great inconvenience to everyone else associated
with the Round Table Conference) to live in a settlement house in the East End.153
During his stay in London, he frequently reiterated to correspondents and the press the
joy he and the East-Enders took in each others’ company and how he was able to explain
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India’s position to them.154 One day he was able to teach the children in the
neighborhood about ahimsa and common roots between Sanskrit and English words.155
For Gandhi, the important task of his visit to England was to “place before the British
public the Case for India.”156
But educating unemployed Lancashire workers was especially important and
would take extra effort. In Lancashire, Gandhi had not only to combat general prejudice
and misinformation about Indian nationalism, but to confront the deeply held assertion
that his actions were depriving thousands of their livelihood. An English friend of
Gandhi’s, according to Gandhi’s newspaper Young India, claimed that it was “not
possible for men and women under such conditions to take a balanced or rational view of
things or policies!”157 But Gandhi was determined to convince Lancashire society of the
justness of his demands by seeing “as much as possible of working people there who are
engaged in the cotton trade and [getting] with them face to face and heart to heart.”158
Gandhi intended to explain his beliefs about swadeshi and swaraj to Lancashire workers
and industrialists. In an interview with the Press prior to the visit, Gandhi said that,
“there is so much misunderstanding [in Lancashire] about what we have done with
foreign cloth. If I went up there and talked with them I should be cross-examined, and
would speak to them without reserve.”159 Gandhi’s aim in going to Lancashire was not,
as Charles Andrews and Lancashire society hoped, to “learn the facts of the position of
Lancashire and how the policy of the All-India Congress has affected that position” so
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that he would take pity on Lancashire and end the boycott.160 He was merely going to
Lancashire in an attempt to alleviate any bitterness there by educating the public about
his ideas about swadeshi and swaraj.
Education was Gandhi’s primary goal, but secondary to that was the hope that by
explaining his mission Gandhi could persuade English people to support swaraj. In an
article entitled “What I Want,” published in The Evening Standard, Gandhi stated, “What
I want is peace for India. I want the people of Britain to help me.”161 In Lancashire, he
told his audience, “I am powerless to do anything without the active co-operation of
Lancashire and then of Englishmen in other parts of Great Britain.”162 Gandhi said, “I
am…acquaint[ing] myself with their [British] mentality, and trying to give them as I
know it the correct situation in India.”163 By countering “the vicious propaganda going
on today in England to prejudice the Indian cause,” Gandhi hoped to see “the creation of
goodwill between the two countries.”164
“Disappointment”165: the failure of communication between Gandhi and cotton
society
In spite of efforts on both sides to create amity between Lancashire and India,
Gandhi and Lancashire mill workers and mill owners had such different visions of the
past and the future that they could not communicate effectively about the causes and
solutions to the boycott. Cotton society would not relinquish their romanticization of
Lancashire’s economic past and they insisted on interpreting the Indian boycott as a
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momentary irregularity in Lancashire’s normal export business. Even when Lancashire
heard Gandhi’s arguments about the necessity of the boycott (for instance, trade union
leaders sympathized with Gandhi’s attempts to alleviate the condition of the Indian
peasants) they misinterpreted the context, minimizing the spiritual and nationalist aspects
of the boycott.
Narrow Nationalism vs. Peasant Uplift: the dispute over the nature of the boycott
Lancashire cotton society refused to accept Gandhi’s interpretation of the boycott
as a movement comprising economic, political, and spiritual motivations. According to
the nationalist newspaper Young India, Gandhi “poured out his heart before them
[Lancashire workers] for three quarters of an hour—describing how economics and ethics
and politics were in his life inextricably mixed up.”166 This message was completely lost
on the Lancashire audience, who insisted on making distinctions between what they
called the “political boycott” and the “economic boycott.” The phrase “political boycott”
was used by the English to designate the “narrow nationalism” that specifically targeted
Lancashire cloth products.167 The term “economic boycott,” on the other hand, was used
to indicate a free-trade choice not to buy British goods but to support native industry.168
This misconception then allowed cotton society to dismiss the strength of the boycott
movement. Once people in Lancashire categorized the boycott as either economic
opportunism or political maneuvering, they argued that Indians could be threatened or
cajoled into abandoning it. If the boycott were merely a political move by a minority,
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then presumably it could be crushed by sufficient force from the English government.169
Alternatively, if the boycott were exclusively an attempt to create a solution to India’s
economic problems, then alternate industries could be developed in India that would not
compete with Lancashire textiles. For instance, George Brame suggested that the Indian
peasants might charge more for their rice instead of weaving cotton.170 Mill owners and
workers saw the “economic boycott” as negligible and focused on the “political boycott,”
instead of seeing the boycott as a movement that integrated various concerns in Indian
society. Creating a distinction between economic and political boycott allowed
Lancashire commentators to marginalize the boycott as the work of a small group of
malicious nationalists who bullied the rest of India into sabotaging their own economy.171
Representatives of the cotton industry attacked the boycott as a form of
“narrow,”172 “dangerous”173 nationalism that specifically targeted English, and indeed
Lancashire, cloth products. Depictions of the boycott as the work of a small group of
malicious nationalists were common. The Cotton Factory Times’ commercial
correspondent in Calcutta declared that the Congress used social exclusion to “stifle any
cry of dissent, so that though Congress represents actually only a minority, it has been
able to deceive the world into believing that its demand is a unanimous Indian one.”174
“As regards resumption of business with Manchester,” he concluded, “political
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conditions alone hinder it.”175 The interpretation of the INC as a small group that forced
other Indians to comply with their nefarious designs bolstered Lancashire’s conviction
that the boycott was a deviant campaign, which would soon collapse, allowing trading
patterns to return to normal.
During the visit, Gandhi responded to Lancashire’s characterization of the boycott
as a narrow and selfish political policy by stressing that the boycott was fueled by a
mixture of political, economic, and spiritual concerns. He introduced to Lancashire the
idea of the constructive, or “peasant uplift,” program. Gandhi refuted Lancashire’s claim
that Indian nationalists were motivated by selfish interests by claiming that the Indian
nationalist movement, and specifically the boycott, was initiated in the interests of Indian
peasants. Throughout his visit, Gandhi spoke to the British public as the sole
representative of the Congress and portrayed the Congress as giving voice to the
unexpressed yearnings of the peasants, who could not speak for themselves. The INC
was, he argued, “essentially a peasant organization” in that it “represent[ed], in its
essence, the dumb, semi-starved millions scattered over the length and breadth of the land
in its 700,000 villages…[and would] sacrifice every interest for the sake of the interests
of these dumb millions.”176 It was those “dumb and starving millions” for whom Gandhi
had come to claim “freedom unadulterated” and in whose interests the boycott was
carried out.177 Gandhi countered claims of swadeshi being a “dangerous form of
nationalism”178 by arguing that it was the only solution to the problem of Indian poverty.
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He explained the economic arrangements that left Indian peasants unemployed for six
months of the year and the program of spinning and weaving that he tried to implement
as a palliative to this poverty. He regretted the effects of the boycott on Lancashire, but
was consoled by the fact that it was, as he told the mill owners, “a result of the steps I
took, and had to take, as part of my duty towards the…starving millions of India.”179
“Symbol of Salvation”180: Gandhi explains and Lancashire ignores the spiritual
implications of khadi
Lancashire cotton society refused to listen to what Gandhi said about swadeshi as
a spiritual program. Even as representatives of the cotton industry absorbed Gandhi’s
message of peasant uplift, they ignored or distorted other aspects of his argument. T. D.
Barlow, chairman of the main employers’ association, said that, as a result of the visit,
Lancashire now understood that the boycott was not merely political but “was also of
great social significance.”181 Yet in spite of Lancashire society’s sense of gaining a new
appreciation of the social implications of Gandhi’s mission, industrialists and trade
unionists still dismissed the idea that there was a spiritual aspect of the boycott. Young
India reported that Gandhi told Lancashire that he could “take before them [the peasants]
a message of God only by taking the message of sacred work before them.”182 In
Lancashire newspapers, the idea that spinning is “sacred work” was entirely lost, as was
the idea that Gandhi saw khadi as bringing God to the peasants. What Gandhi articulated
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as a spiritual cleansing, “an entirely self-purifactory endeavour,”183 Lancashire
reinterpreted as social or economic reform.
The extent to which Barlow and his cohort failed to understand Gandhi’s
intentions is revealed in Barlow’s musing that “M [sic] Gandhi would, he presumed,
accept any alternative craft that would provide what he was seeking to achieve—
enlargement and economic betterment of the peasant life.”184 This idea, which was
echoed by George Brame, a trade unionist, does not take into account Gandhi’s statement
in the Daily Herald (a London-based paper) that the “spinning wheel is for India’s
starving millions the symbol of salvation.”185 When representatives of the cotton
industry did note the spiritual aspect, it was only to denigrate it.186 The most benign
judgment Lancashire passed on Gandhi’s spiritual ideas was that they were “sincere
enough, but for the most part impractical.”187
“A Historical Fact”: Gandhi and Lancashire contest the nature of British
imperialism
Representatives of the cotton industry argued that while Gandhi’s aims for
peasant uplift were worthwhile, the boycott was not a responsible or appropriate solution.
T. D. Barlow argued that although Lancashire “must sympathise” with Gandhi’s peasant
uplift program, “the boycott has cut off a trade which it has taken generations to build up
and the results to those dependent on that trade are catastrophic.”188 In almost the same
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words, George Brame told Gandhi that although trade unionists “had every sympathy
with Mr. Gandhi in his efforts to try and uplift that class…the system he [Gandhi] was
putting into operation was certainly having grievous results upon Lancashire cotton
operatives generally.”189 Spokesmen for the cotton industry persisted in believing that
Lancashire’s trade with India should continue unabated without harming Indian interests,
and that the boycott was a thoughtless, destructive impulse.
The criticism of Gandhi’s methods often led into the argument that Gandhi did
not understand (as Lancashire industrialists did) the forces with which he was working.
Barlow worried that “Mr. Gandhi must find it difficult to differentiate between the
political aspirations of Congress and their economic effects.”190 At the opposite end of
the political spectrum from Barlow, “Rover,” the weekly commentator of the Cotton
Factory Times, stated that “in his effort to secure the independence of his country,
Gandhi is ignoring the all-important economic laws which are the real basis of the
problem of India.”191 Lancashire spokesmen were impressed by “the sincerity and
earnestness of the little man in the loin cloth” but felt that but he was “grasping at the
shadow and missing the substance.”192 The secretary of the Heywood Cardroom
Association argued that Gandhi was mistaken in his tactics because the boycott was “in
no way calculated to assist India toward independence.”193 The portrayal of Gandhi as a
naïve player in a vastly complicated economic and political game bolstered Lancashire’s
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argument that Indians were not yet ready for independence and that “any withdrawal of
British power from India will open the way to a period of prolonged conflict.”194
One of the manifestations of Lancashire’s commitment to the standards of the
nineteenth century was the belief that the imperial relations of the nineteenth century
were beneficial and normative. The premise that empire (and imperial trading patterns)
was good for colonial subjects and for England was accepted by almost everyone. An
editorial in the Manchester Guardian rejoiced that “Lancashire’s rightful heritage to a fair
share of the Indian market does not conflict with Great Britain’s trusteeship for the
welfare of India as a whole.”195 Opposition to the boycott, raised tariffs, and the growth
of the Indian mill industry was couched as paternalist protection of “masses of Indians,
who are undoubtedly suffering” from the ill-conceived plans of self-absorbed Indian
nationalists and industrialists.196 Spokesmen for the cotton industry argued that the
boycott harmed Indians as much as it did the English. “If...the door is barred to goods
that are not [of] Indian origin, the natives themselves are going to be the sufferers,”
warned the Textile Mercury.197 The Manchester Chamber of Commerce elaborated on
this argument:
“India raw cotton exports will suffer if Lancashire doesn’t buy them; other
Indian exports will suffer if Britain can’t buy them because of
unemployment; Indian consumers will suffer if British goods aren’t there
on a free market to compete with Indian goods.”198
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In contrast to the wise, responsible, caring Lancashire industrialists, Indian nationalists
were portrayed as either naïve or conniving.199 It was in this light that John Grey, a mill
owner, stated his opinion that “Mr Gandhi does not, I suggest, appreciate fully the
power” of the forces with which he was meddling.200 Only English rule (and Lancashire
cotton) could save Indians from themselves.
There was a difference, however, between Conservative and Labour
interpretations of benevolent empire. While both envisioned a return to the past in terms
of the relationship between Lancashire and India, they had different routes to get there.
Conservatives focused on suppressing the Indian nationalist movement by force. They
identified the Indian nationalist movement as “evil”201 and painted Lancashire as an
innocent “victim of political passion and prejudice.”202 They wanted the British
government to return to a more dictatorial relationship with India by ending the Indian
Government’s fiscal autonomy and “securing the complete elimination of the Boycott of
British Goods and Picketing.”203 Major tensions developed between industrial interests
and the London government as the mill owners pressured the government to turn the
clock back in imperial relationships.204 One member of the Manchester Chamber of
Commerce wrote that to “rely solely on what is called a policy of goodwill, but which is
really a unilateral policy of concessions on the part of Great Britain…is to fly in the face
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of all the teachings of history.”205 The London government was continually fending off
accusations that the British government had abandoned Lancashire cotton interests.206
The Manchester Chamber of Commerce declared that “[t]he Joint Select Committee is
concerned with the future good Government of India from the point of view of Indian and
British interests equally.”207 But, it continued, “[i]t cannot be questioned that the British
Parliament is under an obligation to avoid any situation which would imperil the
existence of the cotton trade.”208
Labour and Socialist commentators tended to be more accommodating,
advocating cooperation within the empire. Leftist workers stressed worker solidarity,
even if this was mostly rhetoric.209 The trade unionist George Brame, in his interview
with Gandhi “pointed out the sympathy the deputation had for the Indian
people…and…with Mr. Gandhi in his efforts to try and uplift that class.”210 They talked
more about acknowledging the legitimate demands of Indian nationalists (it is uncertain
which demands they considered legitimate and which illegitimate). Liberal and Labour
cotton society opposed “the rank, overbearing attitude of Winston Churchill and his
kind.”211 In the end, however, despite differences of accent, all of Lancashire society saw
the imperial relationship as benevolent and inevitable.
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While in Lancashire, Gandhi attempted to provide an alternate history of British
rule and the role of economic imperialism in India, which was largely ignored in the
Lancashire papers. Young India reported that while in England Gandhi “combated the
preconceived notions and the hardened prejudices of even educated Britishers who were
systematically being taught false history.”212 Gandhi blamed British rule for making
India “progressively poor and emasculate” economically, politically, and militarily.213
He specifically blamed the East India Company for ruining the village industries and
linked the EIC’s exploitation to Lancashire’s wealth.214 Therefore, Gandhi argued, the
khadi movement was “an appeal to go back to our former calling.”215 Gandhi declared
that the khadi movement was a return to the true, glorious past of India’s prosperous,
autonomous village system that had been destroyed by British rule. This was a direct
repudiation of Lancashire’s version of a history of benevolent, natural economic relations
within an imperial framework in which both India and Lancashire benefited and in which
the nationalist boycott was an unnatural aberration from traditional trade relations. In
Gandhi’s paradigm, England’s current deprivation was merely the result of Indians
reclaiming their birthright.216 Gandhi “urged that England must not build her happiness
on the tombs of millions as she had done.”217 Lancashire was not eager to hear Gandhi’s
version of history, which denied Lancashire’s right to the Indian textile market. On the
few occasions that Lancashire newspapers noted Gandhi’s alternate history, they
dismissed it as entirely Gandhi’s peculiar, erroneous viewpoint.218
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“Cold Comfort from Mr Gandhi”219: Lancashire rejects Gandhi’s overtures
As we have seen, one of Gandhi’s goals for the visit was to create support in
Lancashire for the INC. To this end, Gandhi repeatedly presented to Lancashire a
scenario under which the British cotton industry could regain a certain amount of their
trade with India. He remained quite clear that “Lancashire…could never hope to get
back to the quantity of goods formerly supplied to India.”220 However, “supposing there
were a full-hearted settlement with India and supposing India had to buy foreign cloth to
supplement indigenous homespun and mill-spun, preference would be given to
Lancashire over all other foreign cloth.”221 Gandhi hoped to win political support for
Indian independence by presenting it as something that would benefit Lancashire
economically. “What will conduce to the prosperity of Great Britain, the economic
freedom of Great Britain,” he asked, “an enslaved but rebellious India, or an India an
esteemed partner with Britain?”222 He promised that an independent India would “deal
with England as a partner.”223 Gandhi’s repeated emphasis on partnership and
friendliness between England and India were intended to counter British fears that an
independent India would impose vengeful economic restrictions on British trade. “I
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have come to give you fair trade,” he promised Lancashire, “[b]ut, if I go without giving
it, it will not be through any fault of mine.”224
In the end, however, Gandhi was to leave Lancashire without giving them “fair
trade,” as Lancashire cotton society completely scorned what it saw as Gandhi’s minimal
concessions. The Clitheroe Advertiser and Times reported that Gandhi “made an
important statement concerning his Lancashire tour and the prospects—slight indeed—of
help from India being forthcoming.”225 The Darwen Advertiser angrily rejected Gandhi’s
offer: “[W]hat he [Gandhi] may do for ‘the suffering operative’ will, to our mind, neither
start a solitary loom nor sell a single piece of cloth.”226 The expectation of economic
revival, the view of Indian nationalism as a fleeting and deviant phenomenon, and the
persistent clinging to idealized nineteenth century standards as normative led Lancashire
to reject Gandhi’s offer because it did not suit their imagined scenario of what the volume
of Lancashire-India trade ought to be. What Gandhi characterized as “the old Lancashire
trade,”227 the Blackburn Northern Daily Telegraph described as “ordinary trading
relations.”228 Lancashire society firmly believed that the market would return to
“normal;” that is, the total dominance of the Indian market that had existed during the
heyday of empire. Anything short of this was unacceptable. The limitations imposed on
the cotton industry and on Gandhi by Lancashire’s commitment to competing visions of
the past and future ensured that no real communication ensued between Gandhi and his
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Lancashire audience. As The Darwen News put it, “Mr. Gandhi has seen Lancashire, and
Lancashire has seen Mr. Gandhi, and there is the end of it.”229
Conclusion:
Today Gandhi’s visit to Lancashire survives in a few photographs decorating
books of Lancashire history, but receives almost no critical attention. Even a month after
the visit, the principal actors in Lancashire had, to all appearances, already forgotten it.
In 1933, several Lancashire industrialists traveled to India to hold “conversations [of] the
greatest cordiality” with Indian mill owners in the hopes of achieving “a satisfactory
settlement of the Indo-Lancashire textile question.”230 The language and hopes of the
Lancashire mill owners remained the same as it had been in 1931, yet no mention of the
failed visit of Gandhi to Lancashire was made. If the visit produced no tangible results
and soon faded into obscurity, why should historians study it? It is precisely because the
visit was a failure that it should be of interest. Recent historical studies have looked at
how marginalized subjects (women, non-whites, non-Protestants) within the empire
interacted with each other, in reaction to or in concert with the imperial state.231 Books
and articles have proliferated in the last ten years or so exploring communication and
exchange between British suffragists, Irish nationalists, Theosophists, and Indian
nationalists, among others. While some of these historians include the caveat that
“moments of cross-national contact between native intellectuals were…often sporadic
and impressionistic [and] also highly context-specific,” other authors overlook the extent
to which nationalists, even in moments of cross-cultural communication “were primarily
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concerned with their own particular projects of self-definition and/or anti-colonial
subversion.”232 The moment of contact between Lancashire mill workers and owners and
Gandhi provides an excellent example of the failure of historical actors to transcend their
own historical and cultural contexts. Although participants spoke of a desire to create a
space for dialogue, the context-specific preconceptions each party brought to the
encounter precluded any possibility of true communication.

232

Boehmer 10.

49

Manuscript Collections Consulted
British Library:
India Office Records, Private Office Records
India Office Records, Private Papers, Charles Freer Andrews Papers
The John Rylands University Library (University of Manchester):
Archives of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners and Twiners,
Workers’ Educational Association, Correspondence and Subject Files
Archives of the Operative Cotton Spinners and Twiners' Provincial Association of Bolton
and Surrounding Districts, Bolton and District Cotton Spinners’ Provincial Association,
Annual Reports
Lancashire Records Office:
Blackburn and District Cotton Manufacturers’ Association
Papers of Frank Longworth, J.P. (includes papers of the Manchester Chamber of
Commerce and of the Joint Committee of Cotton Trades Organisation)
Burnley and District Textile Workers’ Union
Labour History Archive and Study Centre (People’s History Museum/University of
Central Lancashire):
Archives of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Meerut Prisoner papers
Archives of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Papers of Rajani Palme Dutt
Labour Party Archive, International Department, Communist International, League
Against Imperialism 1927-1935
Newspapers Consulted
Blackburn Northern Daily Telegraph (Blackburn, Lancashire, daily) September 24 September 28, 1931
Clitheroe Advertiser and Times (Clitheroe, Lancashire, weekly) February 13, 1931,
September 18.- October 2, 1931
The Cotton Factory Times (Manchester, weekly) January 2 – October. 2, 1931
Daily Herald (London, daily) September 23 - September 28, 1931
Daily Worker (London, daily) September 25 – September 29, 1931
Darwen Advertiser and Courier of Coming Events (Darwen, Lancashire, weekly)
September 25 – October 2, 1931
The Darwen News (Darwen, Lancashire, bi-weekly) September 23 – October 3, 1931
The Indian Textile Journal: A Representative Publication for the Textile Engineering and
Electrical Industries of India (Bombay, monthly) September 30, 1933
The New Leader (unknown place of publication, weekly) September 11 – September 18,
1931
Textile Mercury, incorporating the Textile Argus (Manchester, weekly) February 27 –
March 13, 1931, September 25 – October 2, 1931
Young India (Ahmedabad, weekly) October 8, 1931-October 15, 1931

50

Bibliography
Ali, Tariq. The Nehrus and the Gandhis: An Indian Dynasty. London: Putnam, 1985.
Amin, Shahid. “Gandhi as Mahatma.” In Selected Subaltern Studies, edited by Ranajit
Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988, 288-342.
Boehmer, Elleke. Empire, the National and the Postcolonial, 1890-1920: Resistance in
Interaction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Breman, Jan. Of Peasants, Migrants and Paupers: Rural Labour Circulation and
Capitalist Production in West India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Bridge, Carl and Brasted, Howard. “The British Labour Party ‘Nabobs’ and Indian
Reform, 1924-31.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 17, no. 3
(1989): 396-412.
Brown, Judith M. Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope. New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1989.
Burton, Antoinette. At the Heart of Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in LateVictorian Britain. New Delhi: Mushiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1998.
Cass, Eddie. “The Cotton Factory Times, 1885-1937.” Manchester Region History
Review 17 (2006): 84-92.
Cass, Eddie, Fowler, Alan, and Wyke, Terry. “The Remarkable Rise and Long Decline
of the Cotton Factory Times.” Media History 4, no. 2 (1998): 141-159.
Chandavarkar, Rajnarayan. The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India: Business
strategies and the working classes in Bombay, 1900-1940. Cambridge South
Asian Studies. Edited by C.A. Bayly, G. P. Hawthorn, Gordon Johnson, W.J.
Macpherson, S.J. Tambiah. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Chatterji, Basudev. Trade, Tariffs, and Empire: Lancashire and British Policy in India
1919-1939. Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Chatterjee, Partha. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse.
London: Zed Books Ltd, 1986.
Desai, Mahadev Haribhai. A Righteous Struggle: a chronicle of the Ahmedabad textile
labourers’ fight for justice. Translated by Somnath P. Dave. Edited by Bharatan
Kumarappa. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1951.
Dutt, Romesh Chundar. The Economic History of India vol. 1. Delhi: Publications
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1902,
1963.

51

Flinn, Andrew. “Labour's family: local Labour parties, trade unions and trades councils
in cotton Lancashire, 1931–39.” In Labour's grass roots : essays on the activities
and experiences of local Labour parties and members, 1918-1945, ed. Matthew
Worley, Studies in Labour History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
Fowler, Alan. Lancashire Cotton Operatives and Work, 1900-1950: A Social History of
Lancashire Cotton Operatives in the Twentieth Century. Modern Economic and
Social History Series. Edited by Derek H. Aldcroft. Hants, England: Ashgate
Publishing Limited, 2003.
Gandhi, Mohandas K. Indian Home Rule [or Hind Swaraj] (1910). Translated by M.K.
Gandhi. In Hind Swaraj and other writings. Edited by Anthony J. Parel.
Cambridge Texts in Modern Politics. Edited by John Dunn and Geoffrey
Hawthorn. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
---. Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth. Translated by Mahadev
Desai. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1948, 1983.
---. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi vol. 48 (September 1931-January 1932).
Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1971.
Ghosh, Durba and Kennedy, Dane, eds. Decentring Empire: Britain, India and the
Transcolonial World. New Perspectives in South Asian History, vol. 15.
Hyderabad: Orient Longman Private Limited, 2006.
Ghosh, S. C. “Pressure and Privilege: The Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the
Indian Problem, 1930-1934.” Parliamentary Affairs 18 (1965): 201-215.
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. Flag Code of India (2002).
<http://mha.nic.in/nationalflag2002.htm> (March 27, 2008).
Harnetty, Peter. Imperialism and Free Trade: Lancashire and India in the mid-nineteenth
century. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972.
Hunt, James D. Gandhi in London. New Delhi: Promilla & Co., Publishers, 1978.
Joyce, Patrick. Visions of the People: Industrial England and the question of class 18481914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Kaul, Chandrika. “India, the Imperial Press Conferences and the Empire Press Union:
The Diplomacy of News in the Politics of Empire, 1909-1946.” In Media and the
British Empire, edited by Chandrika Kaul. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006: 125-144.
Kulke, Hermann and Rothermund, Dietmar. A History of India, 3rd ed. London and New
York: Rutledge, 1998.

52

Leadbeater, Simon Robert Brough. The Politics of Textiles: The Indian cotton-mill
industry and the legacy of Swadeshi, 1900-1985. New Delhi, Newbury Park,
London: Sage Publications, 1993.
Low, D. A. Britain and Indian nationalism: the imprint of ambiguity 1929-1942.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Markovits, Claude. Indian business and nationalist politics 1931-1939: the indigenous
capitalist class and the rise of the Congress Party. Cambridge South Asian
Studies. Edited by C.A. Bayly, G. P. Hawthorn, Gordon Johnson, W.J.
Macpherson, S.J. Tambiah. Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle,
Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Muldoon, Andrew. “‘An unholy row in Lancashire’: The Textile Lobby, Conservative
Politics, and Indian Policy, 1931-1935.” Twentieth Century British History 14,
no. 2 (2003): 93-111.
Pandey, Gyandendra. “Peasant Revolt and Indian Nationalism.” In Selected Subaltern
Studies, edited by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988: 233-287.
Parel, Anthony. “Introduction.” In Hind Swaraj and other writings. Edited by Anthony
J. Parel. Cambridge Texts in Modern Politics. Edited by John Dunn and
Geoffrey Hawthorn. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town:
Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Pope, Rex. Unemployment and the Lancashire Weaving Area, 1920-1938. Harris Paper
Three. Preston, England: University of Central Lancashire, 2000.
Pouchepadass, Jacques. Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and Gandhian
Politics. Translated by James Walker. French Studies in South Asian Culture and
Society. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Pratt, Tim. “Ernest Jones’ Mutiny: The People’s Paper, English Popular Politics and the
Indian Rebellion 1857-58.” In Media and the British Empire, edited by
Chandrika Kaul. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006: 88-103.
Pugh, Martin. “Lancashire, Cotton, and Indian Reform: Conservative Controversies in
the 1930s.” Twentieth Century British History 15, no. 2 (2004): 143-151.
Roberts, Robert. The Classic Slum: Salford Life in the First Quarter of the Century.
London: University of Manchester Press, 1971.
Ross, Alan. The Emissary: G. D. Birla, Gandhi, and Independence. London, Glasgow,
Sydney, Auckland, Toronto, Johannesburg: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd.,
1986.

53

Sache,Ivan. India: Historical Maps. May 27, 2004,
<http://www.crwflags.com/FOTW/flags/in-hist.html> (March 28, 2008).
St. John, Ian. “Writing to the Defence of Empire: Winston Churchill’s press campaign
against constitutional reform in India, 1929-1935.” In Media and the British
Empire, edited by Chandrika Kaul. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006: 88-103.
Taylor, A.J.P. English History, 1914-1945. Vol. 15 of The Oxford History of England,
edited by Sir George Clark. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1965.
Thorpe, Andrew. “The Industrial Meaning of ‘Gradualism’: The Labour Party and
Industry, 1918-1931.” Journal of British Studies 35.1 (1996): 84-113.
Tinker, Hugh. The Ordeal of Love: C. F. Andrews and India. Delhi, Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1979.
Trivedi, Lisa. Clothing Gandhi’s Nation: Homespun and Modern India. Bloomington
and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2007.
Utley, Freda. Lancashire and the Far East. London: Unwin Brothers Ltd., 1931.
Walton, John K. Lancashire: a social history, 1558-1939. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1987.
White, Joseph L. The Limits of Trade Union Militancy: The Lancashire Textile Workers,
1910-1914. Contributions in Labor History, no. 5. Edited by Milton Cantor and
Bruce Laurie. Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1978.
Woods, Philip. “‘Business as Usual’? British Newsreel Coverage of Indian
Independence and Partition, 1947-1948.” In Media and the British Empire, edited
by Chandrika Kaul. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006:
145-159.

54

